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3

I. INTRODUCTION
The Challenge of Originalism does many things well: it
showcases the sophistication of current originalist scholarship; it
displays the resonance that originalist arguments have with
diverse and international audiences; and it reminds us that
originalists are far from having won the debate. The Challenge of
Originalism brings together some of the leading lights of
originalist scholarship, and puts them in conversation with each
other and with prominent critics.
The Challenge of Originalism also, as all collections must,
leaves out some important topics. Most prominent is originalism’s relationship to nonoriginalist precedent, a subject of
significant scholarly interest over the past ten years. Also, The
Challenge of Originalism introduces some of the key recent
originalist moves, such as incorporating the concept of constitutional construction, without fully elucidating them.
The essays in The Challenge of Originalism are consistently
nuanced and thought-provoking. The Challenge of Originalism
includes introductory material to originalism and the debates
surrounding it, and its consistently high level of sophistication
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also makes it valuable to scholars already engaged in these
debates.
In Part II, I first describe the important contributions made
by and in The Challenge of Originalism. In particular, The
Challenge of Originalism showcases originalism’s sophistication
and broad appeal. Then, in Part III, I suggest two important and
unresolved challenges to originalism: (1) fully explaining the
nature and scope of constitutional construction; and (2)
describing what role, if any, nonoriginalist precedent retains in
originalism. I end, in Part IV, by suggesting that the essays
exemplify the chief reason for originalism’s continuing and
broad-based allure—the reason it presents a challenge—the
Constitution’s writtenness.
II. THE CHALLENGE OF ORIGINALISM
A. ORIGINALISM’S SOPHISTICATION
The Challenge of Originalism is primarily composed of
essays that—among other things they do well—exhibit
originalism’s increasing sophistication. The first three chapters
present a description of originalism, its origin and current state
(pp. 12–41, 70–86), along with a defense of originalism (pp. 42–
69). Chapters four and five provide a window into the newlyreinvigorated original intent originalism position (pp. 87–119),
and chapter six displays the potential impact of the adoption of
original meaning originalism in the context of Canadian
constitutional law (pp. 120–46). Chapters seven through nine
exemplify the role that constitutional settlement plays and can
play in justifications of originalism (pp. 147–222). Lastly, chapters ten through twelve contain critiques—some sympathetic and
some not—of originalism, especially its original meaning version
(pp. 223–99).
Both the originalists and their critics in The Challenge of
Originalism powerfully deploy a wide variety of concepts,
distinctions, and arguments. For this reason, The Challenge of
4
Originalism is not solely for the newly initiated. Lawrence
Solum’s essay, “What is Originalism? The Evolution of
Contemporary Originalist Theory,” is appropriately first in the
collection because it provides a clear introduction to

4. The essays are well written and describe originalism’s complexity in an
accessible manner.
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originalism’s theoretical evolution over the past forty years (pp.
12–41). He first introduces readers to originalism’s various
incarnations: original intent, original understanding, original
meaning, and original methods (pp. 16–26). Then, Solum
describes the major intellectual moves made by (many)
originalists to advance originalism: the distinction between
original applications and original meaning; the distinction
between constitutional interpretation and construction; and the
fixation and contribution theses (pp. 23–26, 33–36). Solum’s own
most important additions are the fixation and contribution
theses (pp. 33–36).
The best example of originalism’s increased intricacy, on
display in The Challenge of Originalism, is the concept of
constitutional construction. As described by Solum, construction
“determin[es] the legal effect of the constitutional text” (p. 23).
This concept is one of the key moves made by those originalists
5
who advocate original meaning originalism, and it is tied to a
6
host of other concepts, such as legal underdeterminacy (p. 23).
For instance, Jeffrey Goldsworthy states that “interpretation is
frequently unable to resolve interpretative problems raised by
constitutions that . . . are often ambiguous, vague, contradictory,
insufficiently explicit, or even silent” (p. 60).
Many of the “new originalists” place a lot of weight—
7
perhaps too much —on construction. For example, Keith
Whittington argues that originalism can accommodate much of
the “pluralism” in constitutional argumentation within the
concept of construction (pp. 79, 82). When the Constitution’s
original meaning is underdetermined, according to Whittington,
originalists may resort to the various “modalities” of
constitutional argumentation, but in a manner “carefully
disciplined by the overarching interpretative enterprise” (p. 79).
5. Though, there is no necessary reason why originalists of other stripes, such as
advocates of original intent originalism, could not make the same move. See, e.g.,
Richard S. Kay, Original Intention and Public Meaning in Constitutional Interpretation,
103 NW. U. L. REV. 703, 719–25 (2009) (arguing that original meaning originalism is
relatively more open to underdeterminacy than original intent originalism). Original
methods originalists have suggested that their conception of originalism “resolve[s]”
constitutional ambiguity and vagueness, and would therefore eliminate the necessary
precondition for employing construction. John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport,
Original Methods Originalism: A New Theory of Interpretation and the Case Against
Construction, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 751, 752–53 (2009).
6. See Lawrence B. Solum, On the Indeterminacy Crisis: Critiquing Critical
Dogma, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 462, 473 (1987) (providing the seminal definition of
underdeterminacy).
7. I suggest below, in Part III, how this may be the case.
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Similarly, Goldsworthy claims that, within constitutional
construction, “judges may be forced to act creatively and . . .
consider[] matters such as consistency with general legal
doctrines and principles, public policy, and justice” (p. 61).
Indeed, Lawrence Solum labels original meaning originalists’
embrace of construction “perhaps their most important move”
(p. 23), and for two reasons: (1) originalism is more descriptively
plausible when it “acknowledges . . . the fact of constitutional
underdeterminacy”; and (2) constitutional construction “open[s]
the door for reconciliation between originalism and living
8
constitutionalism” (pp. 23–24).
The Challenge of Originalism also provides a helpful
introduction to the intricate intra-originalism debate over
original intent and original meaning. Lawrence Solum, Jeffrey
Goldsworthy, and Keith Whittington represent the original
meaning camp. Goldsworthy directly argues in favor of original
meaning originalism (pp. 46–51), and Solum and Whittington
describe the benefits originalists reap from its adoption (pp. 12–
41, 70–86). For example, as noted, Solum suggests that original
meaning originalism “opened the door for reconciliation
between originalism and living constitutionalism” (p. 24).
Original intent originalists, represented in The Challenge of
Originalism by Larry Alexander and Stanley Fish, are direct in
their support for original intent originalism and criticism of
original meaning originalism (pp. 87–119). Although originalism
9
is currently most prominently associated with original meaning,
advocates of original intent have continued to proffer strong
10
cases for original intent and criticisms of original meaning.
Alexander’s and Fish’s contributions are no exception.
Alexander, for instance, offers a host of arguments: original
intent better fits how humans interpret other texts (pp. 87–89);
the common reasons for adopting original meaning are
unpersuasive (pp. 90–91); and original intent best fits
8. For Professor Solum’s more recent published thoughts on such a reconciliation
see Lawrence B. Solum, Faith and Fidelity: Originalism and the Possibility of
Constitutional Redemption, 91 TEX. L. REV. 147 (2012) (reviewing JACK M. BALKIN,
CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION: POLITICAL FAITH IN AN UNJUST WORLD (2011), and
JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM (2011)).
9. See Keith E. Whittington, The New Originalism, 2 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 599
(2004) (providing a thorough summary of the widespread move to original meaning).
10. Other prominent original intent originalists include: Richard S. Kay, Adherence
to the Original Intentions in Constitutional Adjudication: Three Objections and Responses,
82 NW. U. L. REV. 226 (1988), and Saikrishna Prakash. Larry Alexander & Saikrishna
Prakash, “Is that English You’re Speaking?” Why Intention Free Interpretation is an
Impossibility, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 967 (2004).
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interpretation of the actual document in the National Archives
instead of another—possibly hypothetical—document (pp. 93–
11
95).
Originalism’s sophistication is also displayed in the complex
exchanges between the originalists and their critics. Jeffrey
Goldsworthy’s contribution, “The Case for Originalism,” is a
clearly presented articulation of “[t]he best argument for
originalism” (p. 42). Goldsworthy lists and then defends eight
propositions, each of which builds on earlier ones (pp. 42–67).
For example, Proposition 1 is: “A Constitution, like any other
law, necessarily has a meaning that pre-exists judicial
interpretation of it” (p. 44) (emphasis omitted). Goldsworthy
responds to criticisms of this proposition from a number of
sources, including prominent critic of originalism, Mitchell
Berman (pp. 44–46).
The Challenge of Originalism contains three critical essays,
by Steven D. Smith, Mitchell N. Berman, and Brian H. Bix.
Berman’s essay is the most directly confrontational and, in
Berman’s exchanges with his interlocutors, the reader witnesses
an impressive display of erudition (by both parties). For
example, Berman and Solum both describe what Solum calls the
“contribution thesis” of originalism—that the Constitution’s
original meaning contributes to constitutional law—and the
nuanced distinction between the Constitution’s semantic content
and its legal content (pp. 32–38, 257 n.17).
Another example occurs later in Berman’s essay, where he
offers a coherentist criticism of originalism. Rooted in the
method of a reflective equilibrium, Berman argues that
originalism cannot account for Americans’ case-specific constitutional judgments, such as the wide-spread intuition that John
McCain was eligible to be president despite the Natural Born
Citizenship Clause’s contrary original meaning (pp. 258–73). To
this line of argument, Alexander “den[ies] . . . that one does or
can have constitutional or legal intuitions that pre-exist” (p. 97).
In turn, Berman attempts to rebut Alexander’s point (pp. 268
n.49).

11. Many of Alexander’s claims resonate with those of Richard Kay. Kay, supra
note 5, at 714–19; see also Richard S. Kay, American Constitutionalism, in
CONSTITUTIONALISM: PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS 29–33 (Larry Alexander ed.,
1998) (arguing that original intent originalism is required because it best facilitates
“implementation of a regime of constitutional restraints . . . created by the constitutionmakers”).
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Bix’s essay, “Constitutions, Originalism, and Meaning,”
sounds in the vein of constructive criticism. Bix, for instance,
suggests that one of the key original meaning originalist moves—
to distinguish constitutional meaning from expected applications
of that meaning—may fail to take into account the normative
context of law (pp. 286–91). Bix argues that, instead, meaning
and application are often related in complicated ways and, if that
is the case, then originalists’ clean distinction between interpretation and construction may be vulnerable.
Smith’s essay, “That Old-Time Originalism” (pp. 223–45), is
perhaps the most intriguing of all, from an originalist’s
perspective. Smith characterizes himself as “an originalist
sympathizer” who counsels that originalism’s increased sophistication—so prominently displayed throughout The Challenge of
Originalism—is, or is partly, a negative development. After
detailing some of the ways originalist theory has become more
elaborate, Smith argues that originalism’s increased—
“scholasticized,” Smith says—sophistication has its costs. In
particular, Smith identifies “exclusion and dissolution”:
exclusion of everyone but the most determined and intelligent
from the debate, and dissolution of originalism as a coherent
position on constitutional interpretation (pp. 227–33). Below,
and in Part IV, I expand on Smith’s suggestion that originalism’s
sophistication is harming originalism.
Given Smith’s reliance on and analogy to the Christian
tradition, I wonder if that same tradition suggests a possible
distinction between Smith’s two identified costs of originalism’s
increasing sophistication. First, one could argue that, as
Christian theologians developed and adopted more sophisticated
tools, the gap between theologians and average Christians
widened, with the likely exclusion of average Christians from
high-end theological discussions. This is a cost, but one that
12
nearly all Christian denominations have thought worth bearing,
and for good reason. Theological erudition is not a prerequisite
13
to being a good Christian, and Christian churches have found
that theological sophistication provides a host of benefits, such
14
as greater insight into Divine Truth.
12. Some descendants of the Radical Reformation constitute rare exceptions.
KENNETH SCOTT LATOURETTE, A HISTORY OF CHRISTIANITY 788–90 (1953).
13. John Henry Cardinal Newman articulated this claim in JOHN HENRY NEWMAN,
AN ESSAY IN AID OF A GRAMMAR OF ASSENT 123–31 (Univ. of Notre Dame Press,
1979) (1870).
14. See, e.g., JOHN HENRY CARDINAL NEWMAN, AN ESSAY ON THE

!!!STRANG-291-CHALLENGESOFANDCHALLENGESTOORIGINALISM.DOC (DO NOT DELETE)8/9/2013 3:37 PM

2013]

CHALLENGE OF ORIGINALISM

117

Similarly, sophistication in constitutional interpretation is
not necessary to being a good citizen, lawyer, or judge (or even a
15
good legal scholar!). And originalism’s increased sophistication
has yielded significant benefits. For example, originalist
16
arguments are taken seriously by the Supreme Court, in the
17
legal academy, and have exerted gravitation force even when
18
not successful.
Second, dissolution has clearly occurred to and harmed
Christianity. Christianity’s fragmentation has taken many forms,
and took place over an extended period of time, but it is unlikely
that theological sophistication was a major cause, at least of
19
Western Christianity’s dissolution in the sixteenth century.
Instead, standard accounts of the Reformation cite to a host of
other factors, such as the personal corruption of many of the
20
Church’s leaders and clerics, that contributed to its occurrence.
There are deep divisions among originalists over con21
22
struction, nonoriginalist precedent, the appropriate form of
DEVELOPMENT OF CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE 29–30 (Univ. of Notre Dame Press 6th ed.
1989) (1878) (summarizing his “Theory of the Development of Doctrine”). Of course,
increased theological sophistication is also a result of the Divine mandate to “be[] ready
always to satisfy every one that asketh you a reason of that hope which is in you.” 1 Peter
3:15.
15. Smith makes something like this distinction at the end of his essay (p. 244).
16. E.g., Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
17. Perhaps the major example of originalism’s prominence in the legal academy is
Jack Balkin’s adoption of it. JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM (2011).
18. See NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2576–82, 2584–93 (2012) (Roberts, C.J.,
opinion) (coming to conclusions consistent with the Commerce Clause’s original meaning
without expressly relying on the original meaning and primarily working with and within
precedent); see also Josh Blackman, Back to the Future of Originalism, 16 CHAP. L. REV.
1, 25 (2013) (describing a facet of originalism’s gravitational effect).
19. See, e.g., PAUL JOHNSON, A HISTORY OF CHRISTIANITY 268–81 (1976) (listing,
as causes, unseemly wealth within the Church, clerical abuses, dissolution of the
Thomistic philosophical synthesis, rediscovery of ancient learning, overburdensome
religious requirements, urbanization, an educated and economically prosperous laity, the
printing press, nascent nationalism, growth of the state and dynastic ambition, and papal
insolvency).
20. Id.; BRAD S. GREGORY, THE UNINTENDED REFORMATION: HOW A
RELIGIOUS REVOLUTION SECULARIZED SOCIETY 366 (2012) (“The failure of medieval
Christendom derived . . . from the pervasive, long-standing, and undeniable failure of so
many Christians, including members of the clergy both high and low, to live by the
church’s own prescriptions and exhortations based on its truth claims about the Life
Questions.”); see also EAMON DUFFY, STRIPPING OF THE ALTERS: TRADITIONAL
RELIGION IN ENGLAND 1400-1580 at 479 (Yale Univ. Press 2d ed. 2005) (1992)
(attributing the English reformation to the “social and economic prestige of its more
prosperous or articulate adherents”).
21. Some originalists reject construction, some accept a moderate role for
construction, while others believe that construction plays a robust role.
22. Originalists fall on a spectrum, with some originalists accepting little or no
nonoriginalist precedent, and others accepting some (possibly significant) subset of
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originalism, and the normative justification for originalism.
Over each of these four divisions (among others), originalists
have articulated increasingly complex arguments for and against
their respective positions. These cleavages potentially pose a
challenge to originalism’s integrity, in a way similar to the
debates among Christians during the Reformation.
However, Smith’s use of “scholastic”—though it carries, in
25
Smith’s usage, the conventional negative connotation —suggests
an alternative era when incredibly sophisticated and nuanced
debates proceeded within a context of overarching unity: the
26
period of the First Scholasticism. The twelfth and thirteenth
centuries were a period of tremendous intellectual ferment in
the West, for a host of reasons, and Christian scholars engaged
each other (and non-Christians) with great erudition—and
disagreement—while maintaining the overall coherence of their
perspective. It was not until the Reformation, precipitated by
causes other than theological sophistication, that Christianity
fractured.
Similarly, originalists are engaged with each other (and their
critics) in a sophisticated debate. There is no necessary reason
why intra-originalist disagreements must fracture the overall
nonoriginalist precedent.
23. The various major forms are: original intent, original understanding, original
meaning, and original methods.
24. There are two general categories of justifications offered by originalists: internal
and external. KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL
MEANING, ORIGINAL INTENT, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 110 (1999). Internal justifications
accept the premises and facets of the current practice, and argue that originalism is the
best explanation for that practice. For instance, Professor Whittington claimed that
originalism is required by our practice’s commitment to a written constitution. Id.
External justifications, by contrast, argue that originalism does better than alternatives at
maximizing some good or set of goods. Id. at 110–11. For example, Professor Barnett
argued that originalism’s “lock-in” of the Constitution’s original meaning best protects
the original meaning’s ability to protect natural rights. RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING
THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY 109–17 (2004). This
external” category is similar to Professor Berman’s soft originalism category (pp. 253–
54).
25. See also Steven D. Smith, Natural Law and Contemporary Moral Thought: A
Guide from the Perplexed, 42 AM. J. JURIS. 299, 299 (1997) (using “scholastic” in the
conventional, negative sense).
26. See FERGUS KERR, AFTER AQUINAS: VERSIONS OF THOMISM 8 (2002)
(“Disputation as a method assumes there will be conflicting interpretations of texts and
doctrines that need to be exposed, explored and resolved.”); see also ALASDAIR
MACINTYRE, THREE RIVAL VERSIONS OF MORAL ENQUIRY: ENCYCLOPEDIA,
GENEALOGY, AND TRADITION 222–24, 232–34 (1990) (describing the premodern
university as one of “[c]reative rational disagreement . . . against a background of
agreement”); JOSEF PIEPER, SCHOLASTICISM: PERSONALITIES AND PROBLEMS IN
MEDIEVAL PHILOSOPHY (Richard & Clara Winston trans., St. Augustine’s Press 2001)
(1960) (describing the Scholastic period).
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originalist perspective. Instead, the Scholastic experience
suggests
that
long-term,
constrained—though—creative,
disagreement is possible—and fruitful.
B. ORIGINALISM’S BROAD RESONANCE
The Challenge of Originalism also exemplifies originalism’s
broad resonance with scholars from many different backgrounds.
Originalist contributors include long-time and relatively recent
advocates, Americans and scholars from other countries, and
scholars of varied political backgrounds. Something about
originalism—the power of its arguments, its fit with pre-existing
legal, cultural, or social structures, or, potentially, the ideological
cover it provides—is attracting a variety of scholars.
27
In addition to prominent American originalists, The
Challenge of Originalism includes contributions by Jeffrey
Goldsworthy and James Allan, Australian legal scholars, and
Grant Huscroft and Bradley W. Miller, Canadian law professors.
For American scholars who, typically, read American legal
scholarship, the essays by these scholars are enriching for a
number of reasons.
First, the essays by Goldsworthy, Allan, Huscroft, and
Miller exemplify originalism’s attractiveness to non-American
28
scholars. For example, Goldsworthy believes that the argument
in favor of originalist interpretation is “simple, straightforward,
and powerful” (p. 42).
Second, the essays by non-American scholars provide new
and—for American scholars, I suspect—fresh perspectives on
originalism. For instance, Allan’s argument for originalism
begins at an unfamiliar place: the hypothetical country of
Allania, which moved from “a legally unchecked legislature” to
adoption of a written constitution (p. 181).
At the same time as The Challenge of Originalism
exemplifies the breadth of originalism’s resonance, it also
suggests that originalism’s appeal is limited. The arguments
made by both the American and non-American scholars focus or
depend on written constitutions. Most clearly, Grégoire C.N.
Webber’s essay abstracts from any particular constitution or
27. In this Volume are chapters by Larry Alexander, Stanley Fish, Lawrence B.
Solum, and Keith E. Whittington.
28. Each author writes against the background of a written constitution, either
actual, in the cases of Goldsworthy (Australia), Huscroft (Canada), and Miller (Canada),
or hypothetical (Allan).
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country in order to ascertain the characteristics of a constitution
necessary to make originalism an appropriate interpretative
methodology (pp. 147–78). Webber concludes that originalism
requires, among other things, a commitment to “an original
constitution that is written at the founding” (p. 151).
III. ORIGINALISM’S OWN CHALLENGES
As The Challenge of Originalism shows, originalism poses a
significant intellectual challenge, not only in the United States,
but in other countries (with written constitutions) as well. The
Challenge of Originalism also, as discussed above, includes a
number of essays that voice challenges to originalism. In this
Part, I briefly discuss two additional challenges facing
originalists: (1) fully explaining the nature and scope of constitutional construction; and (2) describing what role, if any,
nonoriginalist precedent retains in originalism. Both of these
challenges share the common, and deeper, problem posed by
originalism’s fit, or lack thereof, with current legal practice.
A major hurdle facing originalism, as articulated by original
meaning originalists, is its significant reliance on constitutional
construction. Originalists who advocate for constitutional
construction still have a lot of work to do elucidating construction: what is the evidence that construction is a necessary
facet of originalism?; when does it occur?; what is the “output”
of construction?; what relationship does it have to interpretation?; how does one know when or where interpretation
leaves off and construction begins?; and, what is the relative
authority of judges, compared to the other branches of the
29
federal government, when articulating constructions? Until
these central questions are fully fleshed out, it is reasonable for
other originalists, and nonoriginalists, to remain skeptical of the
move, for a host of reasons.
To focus only on the most basic question—why must
construction form a part of originalism?—it seems, at least to
30
me, that the underdeterminacy of constitutional meaning is
prima facie, a reasonable position. But, what if the best
conception of originalism contains one or more closure rules
29. And state governments.
30. See Lee J. Strang, An Originalist Theory of Precedent: The Privileged Place of
Originalist Precedent, 2010 BYU L. REV. 1729, 1758–62 (describing the distinction
between metaphysical and epistemic determinacy of law and how it may support the
concept of constitutional construction).
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that, in all (or nearly all) possible cases, result in determinate
31
answers to constitutional interpretative questions? To date,
pro-construction originalists have not provided fully fleshed-out
32
responses in the legal literature. Recognizing this gap, proconstruction originalists have continued to offer arguments and
33
explanation.
Despite the broad array of arguments displayed by
originalists (and their interlocutors) in The Challenge of
Originalism, some of the outstanding issues with which
originalists have grappled were not addressed, or were raised
tangentially. Most prominent among these is the challenge posed
by nonoriginalist precedent (p. 252 (Berman)). Originalists have
34
approached nonoriginalist precedent in a number of ways, but
the reader would not know that from The Challenge of
Originalism.
One can describe the challenge posed by nonoriginalist
precedent in a number of ways. The first way is that, if
originalism does incorporate some/most/all nonoriginalist
precedent, then it risks losing (at least some of) what makes it
distinctive.
A second way to describe the challenge posed by
nonoriginalist precedent is that originalism does not adequately
fit American constitutional law because so much of it is
composed of nonoriginalist precedent. This description ties this
challenge to the prior one: constitutional construction. Both of
these major, outstanding challenges hinge on the practical fact
that our written Constitution’s original meaning does not
account for key components of and large quantities of American
31. See, e.g., McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 5, at 773 (suggesting that original
closure rules eliminate potential underdeterminacy and, hence, the need for
constitutional construction).
32. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, Interpretation and Construction, 34 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 65, 71–72 (2011) (offering a brief rejoinder to McGinnis and Rappaport);
Lawrence B. Solum, The Interpretation-Construction Distinction, 27 CONST. COMMENT.
95, 105 n.21 (2010–2011) (responding to McGinnis and Rappaport in a footnote, and
noting that “complete treatment is outside the scope of this Essay”).
33. See, e.g., Solum, supra note 32, at 103–08 (providing an explanation of
construction as “giv[ing] legal effect to the semantic content of a legal text”).
34. John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Reconciling Originalism and
Precedent, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 803 (2009); Gary Lawson, Mostly Unconstitutional: The
Case Against Precedent Revisited, 5 AVE MARIA L. REV. 1 (2007); Kurt T. Lash,
Originalism, Popular Sovereignty, and Reverse Stare Decisis, 93 VA. L. REV. 1437 (2007);
Randy E. Barnett, Trumping Precedent with Original Meaning: Not as Radical as It
Sounds, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 257 (2005); Lee J. Strang, An Originalist Theory of
Precedent: Originalism, Nonoriginalist Precedent, and the Common Good, 36 N.M. L.
REV. 419 (2006).
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35

constitutional law. For both the issue of construction and the
issue of nonoriginalist precedent, originalists face the same
tensions: maintain originalism’s distinctiveness or lose it; fit the
Constitution’s original meaning or fit the practice more broadly.
The broad, international cadre of originalist contributors
shows that originalism faces many of these same challenges and
criticisms in countries with different legal systems and historical
circumstances. For instance, Bradley Miller’s essay shows that,
for originalism to succeed in Canada, it must grapple with and
synthesize Edwards v. AG Canada, commonly known as the
36
Persons Case (pp. 120–46). The Persons Case is Canada’s
37
Brown v. Board of Education because it is a key case in the
38
canon of Canadian constitutional law. The Persons Case is
widely viewed as reaching a just result via a nonoriginalist
methodology (pp. 120–21). Miller argues that the Persons Case is
actually an example of original meaning originalism and,
therefore, originalism can reach the necessary just result (pp.
122–44). Miller relies on the concept of constitutional
construction and shows that the key term, “person,” was
ambiguous, and that originalism permitted a just construction of
the term (pp. 138–44).
Similarly, Grant Huscroft describes another common
nonoriginalist move (pp. 203–22). In Canada, as in the United
States, nonoriginalists frequently argue that constitutional text
is—intentionally or not—vague because of its high level of
generality, and that originalism is therefore inappropriate for
such texts. In arguments that echo those leveled against Jack
39
Balkin, Huscroft argues that bills of rights in general, and the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms in particular, “reflect
the bargaining and compromise that was required in order to
attain the political consent necessary to entrench it in the
constitutional order” (p. 204). Therefore, bills of rights are
“finite,” and originalism offers a principled means for judges to
acknowledge and follow that finiteness (pp. 204–05, 218).

35. Strang, supra note 34, at 430–32.
36. Edwards v. Attorney-General for Canada, [1930] A.C. 124 (P.C.) [more
commonly known as the Persons Case].
37. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
38. J.M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Commentary, The Canons of Constitutional
Law, 111 HARV. L. REV. 963 (1998).
39. See John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, The Abstract Meaning Fallacy,
2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 737 (criticizing Professor Balkin’s “preference for abstract
interpretations”).
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IV. ORIGINALISM’S CONTINUING ALLURE: THE
CHALLENGE POSED BY WRITTENNESS
If ever a theory of constitutional interpretation faced
40
challenges, it is originalism. Demographically, originalists have
been and continue to be a relatively small portion of the legal
41
academy. As a matter of brute practical fact, much of current
American constitutional law and interpretative practice is in
42
As
tension with the Constitution’s original meaning.
importantly, originalism has been, since it first took the stage, the
recipient of continual—and frequently highly-sophisticated—
43
criticism. The Challenge of Originalism prompts the question of
44
why originalism—despite these and other challenges —has not
only not died a quiet death: it has flourished.
There are a number of reasons for originalism’s continuing
allure; I will focus on one that closely fits the essays in The
Challenge of Originalism: the fact of the Constitution’s written45
ness. This fact, more than anything else, I think, accounts for
originalism’s staying power. Pointing to the Constitution’s
writtenness as an important facet of originalism’s pull is not new.
Though scholars across the interpretative spectrum have made
46
this point, the essays in The Challenge of Originalism exemplify
40. See, e.g., BARNETT, supra note 24, at 89–90 (“The received wisdom among law
professors is that originalism in any form is dead, having been defeated in intellectual
combat sometime in the 1980s.”).
41. See Lee J. Strang, Originalism as Popular Constitutionalism?: Theoretical
Possibilities and Practical Differences, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 253, 279–88 (2011)
(describing the relationship between political outlook and interpretative method); see
also John O. McGinnis et al., The Patterns and Implications of Political Contributions by
Elite Law School Faculty, 93 GEO. L.J. 1167, 1170 (2005) (finding that “81% of law
faculty members in the study who make political contributions contribute wholly or
predominately to Democrats”); Symposium, Curricular Stress, 60 J. LEGAL EDUC. 110,
112 (2010) (“To be sure, many law professors—probably a substantial majority—have
liberal rather than conservative political views . . . .”).
42. Strang, supra note 34, at 430–32.
43. Professor Solum details originalism’s evolution in response to criticism (pp. 16–
29).
44. For instance, Americans prefer at least some nonoriginalist precedents and
doctrines over the original meaning.
45. The Constitution’s writtenness also plays a central role in originalist thought
outside the essays in The Challenge of Originalism. See, e.g., BARNETT, supra note 24, at
91 (“Once the importance of text or ‘writtenness’ is conceded, some version of
originalism becomes must harder to resist.”); WHITTINGTON, supra note 24, at 47
(defending the “claim that an originalist interpretive approach is somehow required by
the very fact that the United States has a written constitution”); see also Andrew B.
Coan, The Irrelevance of Writtenness in Constitutional Interpretation, 158 U. PA. L. REV.
1025, 1027–28 (2010) (describing the widespread originalist appeal to the Constitution’s
writtenness).
46. As Professor Berman summarizes the nonoriginalist perspective, “the original
public meaning of the constitutional text and the original semantic intentions of its
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the tight connection between originalism and written constitutionalism.
47
Professor Solum’s initial essay describes originalism’s two
core theses, both of which are predicated on the Constitution’s
writtenness (pp. 32–38). Professor Goldsworthy’s essay is
48
likewise predicated on a written constitution. Professor Miller’s
essay seeks to reconcile, in the Canadian context, originalism’s
fealty to constitutional text with the claims of justice presented
in the Persons Case (pp. 120–22).
The Constitution’s writtenness also accounts for major
intra-originalist disputes, such as the debate between original
intent and original meaning originalists. Both sides in this debate
contend that they are more faithful to how one does and should
interpret written documents, like the Constitution. For example,
Larry Alexander contends that original intent best accounts for
Americans’ fealty to the written document in the national
49
archives (pp. 93–94). Similarly, Stanley Fish’s argument is textcentric: “My answer to the question ‘What is the meaning of a
text?’ is simple and categorical: A text means what its author or
authors intend” (p. 100).
Grégoire Webber’s essay, “Originalism’s Constitution,”
focuses on the relationship between originalism and its “subject
matter of interpretation,” which, Webber argues, “cannot so
easily be divorced from an interpretative approach” (p. 150).
Webber concludes that originalism has three core commitments,
50
including that an originalist constitution “is written” (p. 151).
Grant Huscroft makes a similar move in the Canadian context
by arguing that adoption of the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms has the interpretative consequence that the adopted
rights are the only rights constitutionally protected because “bills
authors are relevant” (p. 248). See also p. 250 (“Virtually nobody denies that the original
meaning of a constitutional provision is always relevant to the interpretative task, and
few theorists deny that it is frequently a weighty consideration.”).
47. Professor Solum’s other work, especially his unpublished paper, also rests on
the Constitution’s writtenness. See Lawrence B. Solum, Semantic Originalism,
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1120244 (last updated Nov. 25, 2008).
48. See also Whittington (p. 71) (summarizing his view that “originalism is the best
approach to interpreting a written constitution”).
49. See also Larry Alexander, Introduction, in CONSTITUTIONALISM: PHILOSOPHICAL
FOUNDATIONS 1–5 (Larry Alexander ed., 1998) (making a similar point); Kay, supra note
11, at 29–30 (same).
50. Webber also plays out implications of originalism’s need for writtenness: the
original constitution’s meaning is tied to a particular historical event (p. 152); the original
constitution’s text is a fixed reference for constitutional meaning (p. 153); and the
original constitution’s text’s meaning is “discoverable as a ‘social fact’” (p. 153).
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of rights are finite instruments” (p. 204). Relatedly, James Allan
contends that, based on the reasons a polity would adopt a
written constitution in the first instance, “originalism is the least
bad (or, in that sense, the best) approach to interpreting it” (p.
181).
Conversely, originalism’s critics in The Challenge of
Originalism question whether the Constitution’s writtenness
leads to the originalists’ conclusions. For instance, Professor
Berman tentatively proffers a “complex” theory of constitutional
interpretation that would have places for “arguments of text”
and of original meaning, and that gives these and other reasons
different weights, but which would not give original meaning
conclusive weight (pp. 275–77). Professor Bix questions whether
originalism can plausibly apply to all constitutions or is limited to
the U.S. Constitution (pp. 292–98).
In addition to being addressed by the essays, the
Constitution’s writtenness also accounts for the continuing
discussion over the two challenges to originalism I earlier
identified: the role of constitutional construction and the
viability of nonoriginalist precedent. One of constitutional construction’s key characteristics is that it identifies the limits to the
text’s reach: the limits to the written Constitution’s power to
bind. Originalists currently fracture on the extent of the
51
Constitution’s constraint on constitutional construction.
Similarly, nonoriginalist precedent presents originalists with the
conflict between the written Constitution and contrary Supreme
Court pronouncements. Originalists have also not achieved
52
consensus on how to resolve that conflict.
53
Professor Smith’s essay, described above, worries that
originalism’s sophistication may lead to exclusion of all but the
most stout hearted from the debate and the possible dissolution
of originalism itself (pp. 227–33). I suggested earlier that
sophistication may not result in exclusion, or that potential
exclusion may be a cost worth bearing, and that it is not clear
that sophistication will lead to dissolution. Let me now suggest
that the sophistication so ably displayed in The Challenge of

51. See Solum, supra note 8, at 166–68 (describing how originalists have different
views on the constraint the Constitution’s original meaning imposes on constitutional
construction).
52. See sources cited, supra note 34 (providing a selection of the contending
approaches).
53. Supra Part II.A.
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Originalism is the result of our commitment to a written
constitution.
Texts that play central roles in human culture, practices, and
institutions, accumulate around them ever-more sophisticated
engagement with those texts. Returning to Smith’s analogy to
religion, Christians’ and Christianity’s engagement with the
Bible, from its inception, grew in complexity. Christians, for
example, grappled with (their understanding of) the nature of
Jesus Christ, and his relationship to God the Father and Holy
Spirit, only after facing new historical and theological
circumstances that the Bible did not—at least not
54
perspicaciously—answer. As Christianity more fully articulated
the doctrine of the Trinity, both the doctrine itself and the
arguments supporting it, created a complex intellectual
55
architecture.
The Constitution’s central role in American cultural,
political, and legal life make similar sophistication of
constitutional law and interpretation inevitable. Americans care
about how and what the Constitution means, and increased
sophistication is one result of attempts to answer those
questions.
V. CONCLUSION
The Challenge of Originalism is accessible to the newlyinitiated while remaining worthwhile for those deeply engaged in
the debates over originalism. The Challenge of Originalism
showcases the broad appeal of originalism and the subtlety with
which its proponent and opponents engage. The Challenge of
Originalism also displays the centrality of the Constitution’s
writtenness to originalism. Lastly, The Challenge of Originalism
reminds us that there remains a great deal for originalists to do,
especially further explanation of constitutional construction and
the status of nonoriginalist precedent.

54. See NEWMAN, supra note 14, at 14–21 (describing the background and
development of the doctrine of the Trinity).
55. See, e.g., SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA I, QQ. 27–43
(Benziger Bros. ed., Fathers of the English Dominican Province trans., 1947) (1273)
(explaining the now-complex doctrine of the Trinity).

